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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On appeal, Robert Charles Elizarraraz asserts the district court erred when it determined
it had the authority to extend a no contact order, and the district court abused its discretion when
it amended the no contact order by extending its duration. The plain language of the judicial rule
governing the modification or termination of no contact orders, Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(b ),
does not authorize a district court to extend the duration of a no contract order.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued the district court correctly determined that the
plain language of Rule 46.2 gave the court the authority to modify the no contact order by
extending its duration, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by extending the no
contact order. (See Resp. Br., pp.8-15.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's arguments on the interpretation of
Rule 46.2.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated m
Mr. Elizarraraz's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err when it determined it had the authority to extend the no
contact order?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it amended the no contact order by
extending the order's duration?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Determined It Had The Authority To Extend The No
Contact Order
A.

Introduction
Mr. Elizarraraz asserts the district court erred when it determined it had the authority to

extend the no contact order.

The plain language of Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(b) does not

authorize a district court to extend the duration of a no contract order.

Further, the plain

language interpretation of Rule 46.2(b) would not produce an absurd result.

B.

The Plain Language Of Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(b) Does Not Authorize A District
Court To Extend The Duration Of A No Contact Order
The plain language of Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(b) does not authorize a district court to

extend the duration of a no contract order. Subsection (b) of Rule 46.2, entitled "Modification or
Termination at Request of Protected Person," provides that, "A protected person named in a no
contact order may request modification or termination of that order by filing a written and signed
request with the clerk of the court in which the criminal offense is filed." I.C.R. 46.2(b).
The plain, ordinary meaning of the word "termination" in the Rule does not authorize the
extension in time of a no contact order. See Termination, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10 th ed.
2014) ("The end of something in time or existence; conclusion or discontinuance."). Moreover,
the term "modification" in the Rule cannot include changes in time to a no contact order, because
such an interpretation would improperly render the "termination" language in the Rule
surplusage. See Obendo,f v. Terra Hug Spray Co., 145 Idaho 892, 900 (2008); Modification,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10 th ed. 2014) ("A change to something; an alteration or
amendment."). If"modification" in the Rule encompassed changes in time to a no contact order,
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the term would necessarily include changes shortening or ending the order in time, as well as
changes extending the order in time.

But that would render the "termination" language

surplusage, as both modification and termination would cover the district court's authority to end
in time a no contact order. See Obendoif, 145 Idaho at 900.
Based on cases from other jurisdictions, the State argues there is no "overlap whatsoever
between 'modification' and 'termination,"' because modification "presupposes that the modified
thing will still be around after the change, alteration, or amendment," while termination "does
not." (See Resp. Br., p.11.) However, a more complete examination of the case law from two of
the five other jurisdictions undermines the State's argument.
For example, the State cites an Ohio case, Smith v. Ray, 72 N.E.2d 921 (Ohio Ct. App.
1947). (Resp. Br., p.11.) In Smith, the Ohio Court of Appeals stated, "The power to modify
does not confer the power to destroy." Smith, 72 N.E.2d at 927. But the State has neglected to
mention that, after Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the difference between modification
and termination of alimony was "a distinction without a difference.

'Modification' and

'termination' of an alimony award are simply different points or degrees on the same
continuum." See In re Adams, 543 N.E.2d 797, 799 (Ohio 1989). Later, the Ohio Supreme
Court expressly rejected an argument that "the term 'modify' ... has a different meaning from
the term 'terminate' .... " Kimble v. Kimble, 780 N.E.2d 273, 274 (Ohio 2002). In Kimble, the
Ohio Supreme Court instead concluded, in light of Adams, "that a motion to terminate spousal
support falls within the definition of a 'modification,' since it seeks to alter, change, or reduce
the support award." Id. at 274-75.
The State likewise did not mention developments in Arizona law after a case cited in the
Respondent's Brief, Diefenbach v. Holmberg, 26 P.3d 1186 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). (See Resp.
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Br., pp.11-12.) The Arizona Court of Appeals in Diefenbach did not agree "that the term 'nonmodifiable' is synonymous with 'non-terminable."' Diefenbach, 26 P.3d at 1187. However, the
Arizona Supreme Court later addressed a different provision of the statute at issue in Diefenbach,
noting the term "terminate" was amended into the provision six years after it first used the term
"modify." In re Marriage of Waldren, 171 P.3d 1214 (Ariz. 2007). Per the Court in Marriage of
Waldren, the legislative history of that amendment "shows that the legislature did not deem the

addition of the word 'termination' a substantive change; that is, [the statute] was viewed as
including the power to modify and terminate maintenance and support provisions both before
and after the amendment." Id. at 1217. Further, the parties in that case did "not dispute that
during those six years 'modification' was understood to include 'termination."' Id.
The Arizona Supreme Court in Marriage of Waldren held, "Diefenbach does not guide
our inquiry because it addressed a unique provision ... a provision not at issue in this case." Id.
at 1218. The Marriage of Waldren Court also disapproved "of dictum in Diefenbach stating that
while courts lack jurisdiction under [another statute] to modify decrees regarding non-modifiable
maintenance terms, they retain jurisdiction to terminate such provisions." Id. at 1218 n.4.
Thus, a more complete examination of the case law from those two jurisdictions serves to
undermine the State's argument.

The Ohio Supreme Court expressly rejected the type of

argument advanced by the State, while the Arizona Supreme Court called such arguments into
doubt. See Kimble, 780 N.E.2d at 274; Marriage of Waldren, 171 P.3d at 1217-18.
The State further contends that, even if there were some overlap between shortening an
order and terminating it, the district court in the instant case extended the no contact order,
"which has no overlap with termination." (See Resp. Br., p.12.) But as Mr. Elizarraraz asserted
before the district court: "[T]he Rule only permits one action regarding its duration. The rule
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provides that the court may terminate the order prior to its expiration. It does not permit the
court to take the opposite step to extend the order."

(See Limited R., p.32 (emphasis in

original).) If modification as used in the Rule encompassed changes in time to a no contact
order, the term would necessarily include changes shortening or ending the order in time, as well
as changes extending the order in time. Shortening, ending, or extending a no contact order
would all be "changes" to the order, fitting within the plain meaning of "modification." See
Modification, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY.

Thus, this argument by the State would still

improperly render the "termination" language in the Rule (which also covers ending an order)
surplusage. See Obendorf, 145 Idaho at 900.
In sum, despite the State's arguments, Rule 46.2(b), using the plain, ordinary meaning of
the Rule's language, and giving meaning to every word in the Rule, does not authorize a district
court to extend the duration of a no contact order.

C.

The Plain Language Interpretation Of Rule 46.2(b) Would Not Produce An
Absurd Result
The plain language interpretation of Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(b) would not produce an

absurd result. If the Rule allowed for extending the duration of a no contact order, district courts
would be able to indefinitely extend such orders, a practice disapproved of by the Idaho Supreme
Court. See State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 772 (201 O); State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175-76
(2008).

Thus, the plain language interpretation of Rule 46.2(b), which does not authorize

extending the duration of a no contact order, would not produce an absurd result. Additionally,
the plain language interpretation of the Rule would not produce an absurd result because
individuals have other ways to obtain protection orders, such as domestic violence protection
orders. See LC. § 39-6304.
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The State argues that Mr. Elizarraraz's "approach would lead to absurd results" because
"it would incentivize courts to enter the longest possible no contact orders." (Resp. Br., p.13.)
But just because the State sees the plain language approach to the Rule as "defendantpenalizing," does not mean the approach is unreasonable or would lead to "absurd results." (See
Resp. Br., p.13.) Rather, the State undercuts its absurd results argument by admitting that "a
lengthy order in the first instance would invariably be proper under Castro and Cobler," and "[a]
50-year order could always be terminated at the victim's request, if things improve." (See Resp.
Br., p.13.)
The plain language of Rule 46.2(b) does not authorize a district court to extend the
duration of a no contact order. Also, the plain language interpretation of Rule 46.2(b) would not
produce an absurd result. Thus, the district court erred when it determined it had the authority to
extend the no contact order. The order regarding the district court's jurisdiction to extend the no
contact order should be vacated, and Mr. Elizarraraz' s matter should be remanded to the district
court for further proceedings.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Amended The No Contact Order By Extending
The Order's Duration
Mr. Elizarraraz asserts the district court abused its discretion when it amended the no
contact order by extending the order's duration, because the district court did not act consistently
with the applicable legal standards. See Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
The plain language of Rule 46.2 does not authorize a district court to extend the duration of a no
contact order. The order amending the no contact order should be vacated, and Mr. Elizarraraz's
matter should be remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
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The State contends that the district court "correctly concluded that the plain text of the
statute and rule authorized it to extend the no contact order." (See Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) The
State argument on this point is unremarkable, and no further reply is necessary.

Thus,

Mr. Elizarraraz would direct this Court's attention to pages 15-16 of the Appellant's Brief.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Elizarraraz respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order regarding the district
court's jurisdiction to extend the no contact order and the order amending the no contact order,
and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 25 th day of September, 2019.

/s/ Ben P. McGreeyy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25 th day of September, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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